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On the afternoon of November 23, 2003,Georgia’s Rose Revolution culminated withan eerie Oedipal image. Two opposition
leaders, Mikhail Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania,
walked into President Eduard Shevardnadze’s office.
Shevardnadze had brought both men into politics
and mentored them; as recently as three days ear-
lier he had referred to them as his children. Yet on
that afternoon they had come to put an end to the
political turmoil Shevardnadze had fathered by
overseeing fraudulent elections. A few minutes after
entering his office the two emerged with Shevard-
nadze’s resignation letter, abruptly terminating his
long career as Georgia’s leader.
The Rose Revolution represented a victory not
only for the Georgian people but for democracy
globally. The revolution that took as its symbol a
red rose (held aloft by Saakashvili as he and his sup-
porters stormed into the Parliament building on
November 22) demonstrated that, by aggressively
contesting elections, exercising basic freedoms of
speech and assembly, and applying smart strategic
thinking, a democratic opposition can defeat a weak
semi-democratic kleptocracy. 
SHEVARDNADZE’S FATE
Shevardnadze’s final act in politics seemed an
ignominious end for a figure who had been broadly
lauded as one of the crucial actors in the peaceful
resolution of the cold war. How did the admired
diplomat who had negotiated with the United States
and stood by President Mikhail Gorbachev during
the last days of the Soviet Union end up leading
such a corrupt, ineffective regime and allow such
massive election fraud?
To fully answer this question, it is essential to
realize that Shevardnadze by the fall of 2002 had
been the leader of Georgia for almost 30 years, with
a brief interregnum when he served as Soviet foreign
minister while one of his lieutenants led Georgia.
Many American and European Georgia watchers
may have wondered how Shevardnadze could do
such a good job as foreign minister and such a bad
job as president of Georgia. But many Georgians
viewed Shevardnadze’s time as foreign minister as an
anomaly, standing out as good work after his poor
leadership from 1972 to 1985 as first secretary of the
Communist Party in Georgia and before his disas-
trous presidency beginning in 1993. 
Too many Westerners were reluctant to hold She-
vardnadze responsible for Georgia’s problems, while
almost all ordinary Georgians blamed him person-
ally. Many held him largely responsible for losing
the rebellious territories of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia during his first years as president. Shevard-
nadze was masterful at speaking to Western politi-
cians and leaders on their brief visits to Georgia.
Many were simply excited to have a meeting and a
photograph with the great statesman; few had the
courage to question him about the problems in his
regime. This remained true as the elections of
November 2003 approached.
Shevardnadze was a brilliant politician, but he
was never a real democrat. As Georgia’s president,
he projected himself as a leader who, because of his
background, was uniquely positioned to bring
about democracy and political modernity in Geor-
gia. However, in many respects he was not unlike
other former communist leaders governing newly
independent countries. Shevardnadze had suc-
ceeded over the course of decades in a highly com-
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petitive political system, but not one based on
democratic legitimacy. 
Shevardnadze knew how to make political deals,
allow political freedoms, use cronyism and corrup-
tion, and do whatever was necessary to stay in
power. He also understood the value of his interna-
tional reputation in presenting his administration to
the West. Yet, as conditions in Georgia deteriorated
during the last years of his administration, and as his
closest protégés became his political opposition, it
was increasingly difficult for Shevardnadze to main-
tain any kind of legitimacy or political strength
domestically. After his party tried to steal the parlia-
mentary elections in November 2003, there was no
institution strong enough to defend him when he
faced somewhat modest demonstrations and very
determined opposition leaders.
As Georgia’s parliamentary elections approached
in the fall of 2003, corruption was rampant, private-
sector growth and foreign investment had slowed,
and many government officials enjoyed ill-gotten
wealth and privilege. President Shevardnadze’s
enormous international prestige had, to a signifi-
cant extent, succeeded in preventing foreign policy-
makers and diplomats from recognizing or coming
to terms with Georgia’s flawed electoral processes,
its corruption, and its failing economy. Nonetheless,
Shevardnadze’s political support within Georgia had
begun to erode since his reelection in 2000. Zhva-
nia, the speaker of Parliament, and Saakashvili, his
justice minister, broke with the president in 2001
and 2002, as did Zhvania’s replacement as speaker
of Parliament, another one-time Shevardnadze pro-
tégé, Nino Burjanadze, in 2003. 
By mid-2003, Shevardnadze was considerably
weaker politically than he had been following the
2000 presidential election when he and his party,
the Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), appeared to
be at the height of their strength. At that time,
although the economy remained weak and corrup-
tion widespread, many Georgians were pleased that
Shevardnadze had managed to bring a measure of
stability to Georgia, and they were beginning to
enjoy greater civil liberties and freedoms. Addi-
tionally, Shevardnadze had set the country on a pro-
Western course and strengthened relations with
Georgia’s most important ally, the United States,
while maintaining a delicate balancing act with
Georgia’s powerful northern neighbor, Russia.
THE STOLEN ELECTION
The November 2, 2003, parliamentary election
in Georgia was marked by rampant ballot stuffing,
multiple voting, late poll openings, ballots not being
delivered to some polling places, and voter lists that
included dead people but excluded thousands of
live voters. Moreover, when the polls closed that
Sunday evening the fraud had only begun. Many
opposition groups felt that, while they could com-
bat—or even live with—a certain amount of fraud
during polling hours, the fraud during the count-
ing of the votes was potentially more dangerous. A
three-party pro-government bloc controlled the
Central Election Commission as well as all local-
and district-level election commissions. As a result,
the pro-government coalition For a New Georgia,
and in the Georgian republic of Ajara, the Revival
party (the authoritarian party that controlled that
southwestern region of Georgia) had ample oppor-
tunity after the polls closed to further fraudulently
increase their votes.
Opposition politicians and civic groups com-
bated election fraud at the counting stage by two
means. First, the International Society for Fair Elec-
tions and Democracy, a Georgian election monitor-
ing organization, conducted a parallel vote and
turnout tabulation—a large, statistically valid sam-
ple of turnout and results. The group stationed
observers all day in 20 percent of Georgia’s polling
places, where they fed observed turnout and vote
totals for each party to a central data-entry office.
Second, an exit poll funded by nongovernment
organizations was released shortly after voting
ended on Sunday. The data from both sources
showed two important things: that both the Revival
party and the government continued their election
fraud in the aggregation of precinct-level results,
and that, among opposition parties, Saakashvili’s
National Movement was the election’s clear winner.
The Burjanadze Democrats, led by Burjanadze and
Zhvania, did not do as well as expected.
The preliminary results did not include Ajara,
home to Georgia’s most fraudulent elections.
Ajaran officials waited until November 6, after
returns from the rest of the country had been sub-
mitted, to turn in their largely fabricated results,
which were based on inflated turnout from inflated
voter lists. The Revival party received 95 percent
of the vote, exceeding estimates by even the most
cynical Ajara watchers.
THE ROSE BLOOMS
Armed with the proof provided by the voting
monitors and exit polls, the opposition refused to
accept the election’s outcome. On November 4, the
Burjanadze Democrats and National Movement
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began a vigil in front of Parliament. For nine days,
demonstrators ranging in number from approxi-
mately 500 to 5,000 stood in front of the Parliament
building to protest the vote fraud. The Burjanadze
Democrats called for new elections, hoping to draw
attention away from their poor showing in the elec-
tion results. The National Movement called for the
president’s resignation, a call that soon caught on
with all the demonstrators and leaders, and
demanded that it be recognized as the election’s true
winners. Throughout this period, tensions between
the rival Burjanadze Democrats and the National
Movement and their leaders, which had prevented
pre-election unification, remained strong.
The government bloc responded to the demon-
strations by waving the bloody shirt of destabiliza-
tion, the last refuge to which an authoritarian, even
a soft one like Shevardnadze, clings. The president
also belittled the protests, maintaining that only he
could guarantee stability in
Georgia and that he would
not resign because of “a few
hundred kids.” Other oppo-
sition parties, such as Labor
and New Rights, opposed
the demonstrations from the start, a mistake that cost
them a great amount of support. 
Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze made clear his
support for President Shevardnadze. Ajaran tele-
vision ran spots comparing Saakashvili to Hitler
and Zhvania to a molting snake, while Revival
party leaders warned of a fascist takeover of Geor-
gia led by Zhvania and Saakashvili. During this
time Shevardnadze made a trip to Ajara and stood
publicly with Abashidze to emphasize their sup-
port for each other.
By mid-November, the two sides had arrived at a
deadlock. The protesters kept up their vigil, but the
president refused to resign as the government con-
tinued to count the votes. On November 14, the
biggest demonstrations up to that time occurred as
more than 20,000 people jammed the streets in
front of Parliament. However, at the end of that
night Saakashvili, by then the undisputed leader of
the opposition, told the demonstrators to go home
and await further instructions. The crowd peace-
fully dispersed. Unclear calls for civil disobedience
began the following day, while rumors of an
inevitable deal persisted. 
The week of November 17 began relatively qui-
etly amid rumors that Abashidze was sending peo-
ple from Ajara to Tbilisi, the capital, to occupy the
space in front of Parliament and show support for
Shevardnadze. Tenaciously, Saakashvili refused to
back down and said he would bring people in as
well to reclaim the space. By late in that week, the
possibility of clashes between opposition demon-
strators and Ajarans appeared to threaten the non-
violence that until then had characterized the
protests. (A clash was avoided on the weekend of
Shevardnadze’s resignation when Abashidze’s sup-
porters left the space in front of Parliament shortly
after Saakashvili and his supporters entered the
building—indicating that loyalty to Abashidze did
not translate into loyalty for Shevardnadze.) Ten-
sions were exacerbated on the evening of Novem-
ber 20 when the government issued the final
election results, which were clearly fraudulent, and
announced the new parliament.
The turning point occurred on November 22,
when Shevardnadze sought to seat the new parlia-
ment. Had he succeeded, the moment of opportunity
for the opposition would
have passed because the
new legislature would have
immediately elected a new
pro-government speaker.
According to the constitu-
tion, the speaker of Parliament assumes the pres-
idency if the president is incapacitated or resigns.
If the speaker then in office—opposition leader
Nino Burjanadze—had been replaced by a pro-
government speaker, there would have been no
use demanding Shevardnadze’s resignation. There-
fore, the opposition disrupted the seating of the
fraudulently elected parliament as soon as a quo-
rum had been reached. The moment Shevardnadze
allowed himself to be hustled out the door by his
security guards, an image televised around the
world, it was over. The emperor was finally
revealed to have no clothes. 
Shevardnadze hung on as president for another 30
hours, but his fundamental weakness had been
exposed. There was no sector of society in Georgia—
no ethnic group, social class, or geographical area—
to which he could turn for support. Even in Ajara,
the relationship between Abashidze and Shevard-
nadze did not bring any real support for the presi-
dent. The only people still backing Shevardnadze
were those who were individually enriching them-
selves through his presidency. This became clear to
Shevardnadze as Saturday night and Sunday wore on.
So, after first insisting that he would not leave office,
by Sunday evening even Shevardnadze saw he had
nowhere to turn, and resigned. Burjanadze under the
constitution became acting president.
344 • CURRENT HISTORY • October 2004
Shevardnadze was a brilliant politician,
but he was never a real democrat.
Georgia’s Rose Revolution • 345
The consolidation of the democratic breakthrough
of November 2003 continued with Georgia’s presi-
dential and parliamentary elections in January and
March 2004, respectively, in which Saakashvili was
elected president in a landslide and the National
Movement party of Saakashvili, Zhvania, and Bur-
janadze won a huge majority in Parliament. Zhvania
was appointed to the newly created position of prime
minister; Burjanadze returned to being speaker of
Parliament. Both the presidential and parliamentary
elections were viewed as generally free and fair. The
elections demonstrated that, while the November
2003 demonstrations may have been small, the
democratic sentiments they expressed were sup-
ported by a substantial majority of Georgians.
How did the undersized protests following the
fraudulent elections of 2003 lead to Shevardnadze’s
resignation and the Rose Revolution? A number of
factors were at play, not least the fundamental weak-
ness of Shevardnadze’s administration, resulting from
his failures as president. But most critical were Geor-
gia’s vibrant civil society; the sometimes ambiguous
role of the international community, US and European
governments, and private foundations; the opposi-
tion’s belated unity; and the destructive role played
by the Revival party and the Ajaran authorities.
FERTILE CIVIL SOCIETY
Georgia during the Shevardnadze years was one
of the freest post-Soviet countries, featuring a vibrant
civil society and numerous interest and advocacy
groups. Shevardnadze claimed—and deserved—a
fair amount of the credit for this. Georgians may have
suffered from rampant unemployment, unreliable
energy delivery, a corrupt and ineffective govern-
ment, and a deteriorating infrastructure, but they did
enjoy political freedom. And Georgia’s weak econ-
omy helped contribute to the vibrancy of NGOs. For
honest Georgians seeking to make a good living, the
civil sector was the place to work because NGOs were
funded by foreign money and could pay decent
salaries. By 2003 many of Georgia’s best and bright-
est were working for NGOs.
In addition to civic organizations, a culture of
activism had emerged; Georgians were not afraid to
demonstrate their discontent following the elections.
While the protests did not reach large numbers until
the weekend of Shevardnadze’s resignation, there was
little attempt to repress them. The groups that har-
ried government officials for months and mobilized
students to participate in the demonstrations, that
monitored the elections and announced how fraud-
ulent the results were, and that publicly criticized the
government for illegal and corrupt behavior—as well
as the thousands of citizens who took to the streets—
demonstrate how important civil society and politi-
cal freedom were in the Rose Revolution.
The media played an equally important role, most
notably the pro-opposition television station, Rus-
tavi 2. Georgian electronic and print media during
the Shevardnadze years were very diverse and
included strongly antigovernment opinions. The
barriers to information for many Georgians were not
censorship, but the frequent blackouts that made it
difficult to rely on television news, and the poverty
that made it difficult for some to pay for newspapers.
During the pre-election period, Rustavi 2 covered
the opposition consistently, providing a regular plat-
form to Zhvania, Saakashvili, and other opposition
leaders. Rustavi 2 also helped fund the exit poll,
which it then publicized after the election.
Lost in the celebration of the Rose Revolution is
the reality that only beginning on November 22 was
it a mass movement. During most of the vigil,
crowds were considerably less than 5,000 people.
The rhetoric of the opposition, particularly
Saakashvili’s, appeared out of place for what seemed
like small demonstrations largely by the political
class. This was clear to anybody who walked by the
demonstrations, as I did.
But most Georgians did not walk by the demon-
strations. They watched them on television, mostly
on Rustavi 2. Rustavi 2’s coverage of the protests
was almost nonstop, except to provide periodic
interviews and roundtables with opposition lead-
ers—who often used the opportunities to inform
Georgians about upcoming demonstrations and
actions. Moreover, the station always showed
images of demonstrators tightly packed together,
shying away from aerial shots that might have
shown that the protesters were crowded in a rela-
tively small space. Rustavi 2’s image of the vigil dif-
fered just enough from reality to give viewers the
impression that there really was a mass movement
actively supporting Saakashvili and the opposition.
INTERNATIONAL NOURISHMENT
The US and European governments sought to
support both Shevardnadze and democracy in
Georgia. Washington backed Shevardnadze because
his government supported America’s major foreign
policy goals, and because strong personal ties
existed at the highest levels of the two govern-
ments. Shevardnadze often spoke of his friendship
with former Secretary of State James Baker, the
Bushes, and other high-ranking officials. It was thus
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difficult for many international figures to realize
that Shevardnadze himself had become an obstacle
to democracy in Georgia. Many preferred to think
that he was doing his best and that the opposition
just needed to be more patient.
Contrary to Shevardnadze’s claim after he was
deposed, the diplomatic and foreign-assistance com-
munities did not wholeheartedly support the oppo-
sition. In fact, for much of 2003 Zhvania and
Saakashvili accused the United States of being too
timid in its criticism of Shevardnadze, particularly
regarding issues of election fairness. American orga-
nizations such as the National Democratic Institute,
for which I worked at the time, worked more with
the opposition. But we were always aware that if we
were seen as too close to Shevardnadze’s opponents
it would hurt us, not least with our own US govern-
ment. To the Georgian president and his supporters
this nuance was hard to discern. Instead, they saw
millions of American dollars going to often highly
effective and committed NGOs
and watchdog groups, which
they viewed, often correctly,
as opposing the government’s
agenda.
In addition to the diplo-
matic help and assistance
money, the Rose Revolution
received critical support from US-based philanthropist
George Soros. It was Soros who encouraged what
became known as the “Serbian model.” He paid for
several trips and exchanges between Georgian and
Serb activists and politicians, during which the Geor-
gians gleaned lessons from Serbs who had helped
defeat Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Soros’s
Open Society Georgia Foundation was a major fun-
der of the exit poll that helped reveal the extent of
election fraud, along with other democracy and elec-
tion fairness projects. And because they were not
funded by a foreign, friendly government, Soros’s rep-
resentatives in Georgia could be more outspoken in
their criticisms of Shevardnadze’s regime.
US assistance to Georgia was critical. It included
study and young leaders programs that allowed
people like Saakashvili to learn about politics in the
United States; democracy-assistance programs such
as the National Democratic Institute, which helped
nurture coalitions among democratic political
groups; funding for domestic organizations that
monitored the elections; and a degree of support for
the opposition leaders. Both Saakashvili and Zhva-
nia had spent years cultivating relationships with
American politicians, NGO leaders, and government
officials. These relationships were sources of
encouragement and support during the period lead-
ing up to and including the Rose Revolution. How-
ever, had the Rose Revolution failed, the opposition
would likely have accused the United States of not
supporting it strongly enough. America’s close rela-
tionship with Shevardnadze and its unwillingness
to recognize Shevardnadze’s turn away from democ-
racy are easily overlooked now.
THE OPPOSITION UNITES
Another factor that played an important role was
the putting aside of divisions among the opposition.
Within 48 hours of the polls closing on November 2,
Saakashvili and Zhvania, who had only recently been
political foes, and Burjanadze found their political
futures tied inextricably together. However, 
they had different goals. Zhvania and Burjanadze at
first wanted to secure a place in the new Parliament:
contrary to the data from the parallel vote tabulation
and exit polls, initial official
returns showed their party
below 7 percent—the thresh-
old for election to the legisla-
ture. Saakashvili’s National
Movement wanted to be rec-
ognized as the election win-
ners based on the same data.
Within two days signals came from the authorities
that the Burjanadze Democrats had made it past the
7 percent threshold. Some saw the announcement as
a clumsy attempt by the government and the Central
Election Commission to separate the interests of the
two parties. There was speculation that a deal had
been made whereby the Burjanadze Democrats
would be guaranteed a place in Parliament if they
stopped supporting the National Movement. 
The Burjanadze Democrats realized, however,
that getting 7 percent or 8 percent of the votes, sig-
nificantly less than they thought they had earned,
would prove a Pyrrhic victory. To a great extent they
felt this way because they did not want to be in a
Parliament dominated by the government bloc and
Saakashvili’s National Movement. Briefly, Bur-
janadze Democrats even spread somewhat implau-
sible rumors that the government had collaborated
with the National Movement during the election as
part of a plan to exclude the Burjanadze Democrats
from political power.
So, in a bold stroke of partial genius, the Bur-
janadze Democrats called for new elections and
then announced that if new elections were not held,
they would boycott the new Parliament and not
Bloodshed was avoided largely
because the president was too
politically weak to command it.
take the seats they had earned. This position under-
scored the extent to which the elections had been
fraudulent, but it was also perceived as an attack on
the National Movement because it implied that that
party’s defeat of the Burjanadze Democrats was
somehow illegitimate. The National Movement
maintained that, whatever else had happened in the
election, Saakashvili had proved that he was far
more popular than Zhvania or Burjanadze.
Saakashvili did not want to have all the returns
thrown out. The National Movement simply
wanted to be recognized as the winner of the elec-
tion, or to see Shevardnadze resign. 
These machinations occurred behind the scenes.
Publicly, the opposition parties presented an image
of unity. And this unity, while strained from the
beginning, was absolutely essential. Shevardnadze
would have been able to defeat any of his former
protégés individually; with the three leaders
together, the president was in a far more difficult
position. According even to the exit polls and par-
allel vote tabulations, the National Movement and
Burjanadze Democrats spoke for at most only 45
percent of the electorate, but a majority of the coun-
try’s top organizers and committed activists identi-
fied with one of these parties.
Saakashvili’s seemingly hopeless demand for
President Shevardnadze’s resignation was viewed
more seriously because he was joined by Zhvania
and Burjanadze, who both enjoyed reputations as
being more moderate than Saakashvili. Similarly,
Burjanadze and Zhvania did not have enough pop-
ular support to mobilize people or make strong
demands on the government without the backing
of Saakashvili and his party. It was clear that if the
opposition parties fought among themselves, as
they had for most of 2002 and 2003, Shevardnadze,
not his opponents, would drive events. 
FRIEND OF THE DEVIL
Also working against the president were the coali-
tion partners that he sought out in his moment of
crisis. Until May 2004, the region of Ajara in south-
west Georgia was governed not by the authorities in
Tbilisi, but by Abashidze and his Revival party.
Abashidze was a dictator who exercised complete
power over Ajara, where people had significantly
less freedom of speech and association than their co-
nationals in the rest of Georgia.
Elections in Ajara also were less free. Because
two-thirds of Georgia’s Parliament is elected by a
single-list party vote, rigged elections in Ajara gave
Revival a disproportionately large representation in
the legislature. On November 2, 2003, few were
surprised by election fraud in Ajara, but its extent
was by most measures the worst in Georgia.
The relationship between Abashidze and She-
vardnadze had always been complex. Although
Abashidze publicly identified himself and Revival
as part of the opposition, the two leaders, through
their parties, had cooperated extensively on the
Central Election Commission as well as in Parlia-
ment, and Abashidze had criticized the other oppo-
sition parties. However, Revival and Abashidze were
still disliked outside of Ajara for their undemocratic
regime and their constant threats of secession from
the rest of Georgia.
When Shevardnadze turned to Abashidze for
help in November 2003—he was the only politician
who could offer real resources and support—it infu-
riated the Georgian people, who saw the two as
partners in election fraud. Shevardnadze exacer-
bated this sentiment when he flew to the Ajaran
capital of Batumi after the election to appear pub-
licly with Abashidze. The latter’s support for She-
vardnadze included sending busloads of Ajaran
toughs into Tbilisi to occupy the space in front of
Parliament after the vigil ended on November 14,
making it clear to the public that Shevardnadze was
the one raising the threat of violence and to the
demonstrators and their leaders that the situation
was beyond negotiation.
After Shevardnadze’s resignation, Abashidze’s
support among Ajarans began to erode as they saw
the changes being made in the rest of their country.
In May 2004 peaceful demonstrators in Ajara, sup-
ported by the Georgian government, forced
Abashidze to flee to Russia in an episode viewed by
many as phase two of the Rose Revolution. Ajara
held democratic elections in June.
THE FIRST SECRETARY’S NEW CLOTHES
It is now easy to forget that in the days immedi-
ately following the fraudulent November 2003 elec-
tion, Georgia’s opposition appeared weak and
disunified. It seemed to lack strong support within
Georgian society, an effective leader, a cohesive
strategy, or any feasible demands. Saakashvili was
quickly emerging as the principal opposition figure,
but many believed he lacked the temperament to
lead. His calls for Shevardnadze’s resignation
seemed desperate and unrealistic. Initial promises
to fill the streets with demonstrators brought well
under 10,000 in front of the Parliament. The oppo-
sition did not seem to have a plan that covered
more than just a few hours or a day. 
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Fortunately for the opposition, Shevardnadze’s
regime was even weaker. During his 10-year rule as
president, Georgia’s government had devolved into
a weak kleptocracy. The government could not in
any meaningful way deliver basic services, begin to
repair Georgia’s crumbling infrastructure, enforce
the law, or collect taxes. Georgia’s weak state could
best be summed up by an old joke: the government
was bad, but at least there was not much of it. As
first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party
from 1972 to 1985, Shevardnadze had been a pow-
erful autocrat running his own fiefdom in a remote
corner of the Soviet empire. As president of inde-
pendent Georgia, he became an ineffective leader
who could not get 20 percent of the vote for his
own party in a fair election.
Beginning in 2000, most of the bright, reform-
oriented leaders and activists in the Citizens Union
of Georgia left the party, many to join Saakashvili
or Zhvania. As a result, the only people left around
Shevardnadze by late 2003 were corrupt officials
like Levan Mamaladze and bitter politicians like
Irina Sarashvili-Chanturia. None of these people
could—or wanted to—explain to Shevardnadze just
how weak he was.
As the events of November 22–23 unfolded, it
became evident that Shevardnadze did not realize
how feeble his position had become. Even after he
was rushed out of Parliament by his own security
team, a gesture that bespoke weakness to millions
watching on television around the world, Shevard-
nadze still tried to cling to power. He briefly
addressed the remaining pro-government demon-
strators from Ajara outside of Parliament and again
asserted his unwillingness to resign.
After he finally left office on November 23, She-
vardnadze made a last attempt to salvage his his-
torical legacy. He insisted he had resigned to avoid
bloodshed. This claim, although nicely consistent
with the overall nonviolent tone of the Rose Revo-
lution, was not entirely accurate. In reality, She-
vardnadze resigned because, finally realizing his
own weakness, he became aware that he no longer
controlled the military and security forces. Blood-
shed was avoided largely because the president was
too politically weak to command it.
THE PROTÉGÉS’ CHALLENGE
In Georgia in the days following the Rose Revo-
lution there was much talk about the Serbian
model. The analogy was not precise—Shevardnadze
and Milosevic were distinctly different types of lead-
ers with very different relationships with the United
States and NATO. But in both systems an active civil
society and eventual unification of the opposition
laid the groundwork for change, and a stolen elec-
tion became the catalyst.
The relatively open Georgian society; the inter-
national community’s support for reform; the
weakness and failure of the Shevardnadze admin-
istration; and elections conducted more fraudu-
lently than almost anybody—even most Georgian
voters—expected, all contributed to the Rose Rev-
olution. A unique relationship and belated cooper-
ation among the opposition leaders—Saakashvili,
Zhvania, and Burjanadze—as well as some critical
missteps by the government, which the opposition
skillfully exploited, also played an important role.
Now the hard work begins as Shevardnadze’s 
former protégés confront the enormous task of
building not only Georgian democracy, but the
Georgian state.
The nine months since the Rose Revolution
have seen some meaningful changes in Georgia.
Three elections have been held, two nationwide
and one in Ajara, that were remarkably free and fair
by the standards of the former Soviet Union.
Saakashvili and his government have taken strong
steps against corruption at all levels of Georgian
society. His nonviolent triumph in Ajara was
extraordinary, and surprised many. However, in
recent months, Saakashvili’s attempts to expand the
Rose Revolution to Georgia’s two other restive
regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, have been far
less successful, and the threat of Russian interfer-
ence remains. 
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“If Soviet leaders calcu-
late on the basis of a
broad correlation of forces and not simply on
a narrow ratio of weapons, they cannot
ignore the geopolitical problems on their
frontiers—in Poland and Afghanistan and
China. . . . A superpower bogged down in
efforts to shore up its immediate weakness
and driven by fears of encirclement may be
entering a period of decline.”
“The Soviet Union and the United States”
Current History, October 1981
William G. Hyland, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
